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BARROWS v. JACKSON
FURTHER ON UNENFORCEABILITY OF RACIAL
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Barrows v. Jackson1
Petitioners sued respondent at law for damages arising
from a breach of a restrictive covenant entered into as
owners of residential real estate in Los Angeles. The cove-
nant provided that no part of the real estate should ever
be used or occupied by non-Caucasians; and that such re-
striction should be incorporated in all deeds. Respondent
conveyed one of the restricted lots without incorporating
the restriction in the deed or making reference to it. The
day after the respondent moved off the property, non-
Caucasians moved in. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to the complaint, the District Court of Appeals for the
Second Appellate District affirmed, and the Supreme Court
of California denied a hearing. The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari and held: Affirmed.
The precise question before the court was whether a
restrictive covenant can be enforced at law by a suit for
damages against a co-covenator who breached the covenant.
The Supreme Court in a six to one decision, Justice Vinson
dissenting vigorously on the ground the question was not
properly before the court,2 held that such a restrictive
covenant could not be enforced against a co-covenator. The
court held that since a restrictive covenant could no longer
be enforced in Equity against non-Caucasian purchasers,
because such enforcement would constitute state action
denying equal protection of the law to the non-Caucasian
purchasers, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,3
the court would not enforce it indirectly by compelling the
respondent to pay damages for breach of the covenant.
Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the court,
and said:
"To compel respondent to respond in damages would
be for the State to punish her for her failure to perform
her covenant to continue to discriminate against non-
Caucasians in the use of her property. The result of
that sanction by the State would be to encourage the
use of restrictive covenants .... The action of a state
court at law to sanction the validity of the restrictive
1346 U. S. 249 (1953) ; and see Note, Unentorcibility of Racial Restrictive
Covenants, 10 Md. L. Rev. 263 (1949), noting Goetz v. Smith, 62 A. 2d 602,
191 Md. 707 (1948).
2 For discussion of this point see companion note which follows.8 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), cited 10 Md. L. Rev., supra, n. 1.
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covenant here involved would constitute state action
as surely as it was state action to enforce such cove-
nants in equity, as in Shelley .... I
As was stated previously, the case of Shelley v.
Kraemer,5 held that where state action is called upon to
enforce a restrictive covenant against non-Caucasian pur-
chasers, there is a violation of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
Court stated that such agreements standing alone are not a
violation of any rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. So long as the agreements are carried out
by voluntary adherence to their terms, and so long as there
has been no state action, the provisions of the Constitution
have not been violated.
In the instant case however, the parties had ceased
relying upon voluntary action to carry out the covenant,
and the state was asked to compel respondent to pay dam-
ages. As a result of such damages, a prospective vendor of
restricted property would either refuse to sell to a non-
Caucasian or else require a higher price from a non-Cau-
casian to reimburse the vendor for the damages he would
incur for the breach of the covenant. Due to these circum-
stances, a non-Caucasian would be unable to purchase and
enjoy property the same as a Caucasian. The prohibition
of these rights by a State would be a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws.
The Petitioners contended that to refuse to enforce the
covenant is to impair the obligations of their contracts
under Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution.' The court
answered this by citing Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,7 which
held the provision is directed against legislative action only,
and not actions of the courts. Another contention of peti-
tioners was that they were denied due process and equal
protection of the laws by the failure to enforce the covenant.
Mr. Justice Minton quoted from the Shelley case to answer
this argument.
"'The Constitution confers upon no individual the
right to demand action by the State which results
in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other
individuals'."'
4 Supra, n. 1, 254-5.
3 Supra, n. 3.6,"No State shall: ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts .. "
' 263 U. S. 444 (1924).
8 Supra, n. 1, 260; supra, n. 3, 22.
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Since the Shelley case in 1948, the state courts have con-
strued the principle strictly, denying injunctive relief to
enforce restrictive covenants.' Maryland in the case of
Goetz v. Smith,10 in 1948 was in accord, denying judicial
enforcement of a restrictive covenant. However, conflict
developed between the States as to the effect of the Shelley
case on the question of whether a covenatee may recover
money damages for the breach of the covenant.
Cases in Missouri and Oklahoma had held that money
damages could be gotten for the breach. The Missouri Court
in Weiss v. Leaon," held that damages and injunctive relief
are two different things, and that while Shelley had held
that giving injunctive relief was unconstitutional, it had
left the problem of damages open. In Correll v. Earley,2
the Oklahoma Court reached the same result. There the
Court, held a claim for damages may be maintained against
a white seller, a straw man, and a non-Caucasian purchaser
for a conspiracy to violate the covenant.
On the other side, the Michigan Court in Phillips v.
Naff," felt that while restrictive covenants themselves are
valid, there could be no more then a voluntary adherence
to their terms. The court felt that no state action could be
taken at all, or the case would be brought into the prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in Roberts
v. Curtis,'4 held that the prohibition against injunctive re-
lief as stated in Shelley was broad enough to cover an action
for damages as well.
After the Barrows decision, there would seem to remain
no room for doubt as to the all-embracing effect of the doc-
trine of Shelley v. Kraemer in precluding any type of State
sanction for racially restrictive covenants.
°Cummings v. Hokr, 31 Cal. 2d 844, 193 P. 2d 742 (1948) ; Rich v. Jones,
142 N. J. Eq. 215, 59 A. 2d 839 (1948); Woytus v. Winkler, 357 Mo. 1082,
212 S. W. 2d 411 (1948).
10191 Md. 707, 62 A. 2d 602 (1948), noted, 10 Md. L. Rev. 263, op. cit.,
supra, n. 1.
u359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. 2d 127 (1949).
22 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1951).
"332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d 158 (1952).
" 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C., D. C., 1950).
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